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This paper examines how non-binding co-operative agreements on marine fisheries 
management can be sustained when management plans in participating countries are 
implemented with error. The effects of implementation uncertainty on voluntary  co-
operation are compared to those of recruitment uncertainty. A self-enforcing co-
operative solution can only be sustained when uncertainty is not too pronounced. Even 
when a co-operative agreement can be achieved, frequent phases of reversion to non-co-
operative harvest levels are needed to support the agreement. The implications of 
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1  Introduction 
Problems in marine resource management have over the years received increasing 
attention among the media and policy makers. Disputes over the management of fish stocks 
have been heated both at the national and international level. At times conflicts have 
culminated in military vessels being summoned to the fishing grounds. Conflicts in fisheries 
management are difficult enough to resolve within a single jurisdiction. The difficulties are 
compounded when a fish stock is divided among separate jurisdictional regions, each with 
their own management authority. Despite a mutual advantage in cooperative harvesting of 
shared stocks, agreements on cooperative harvesting have proved to be difficult to establish. 
Why is cooperation in the international management of fisheries such a fragile endeavor?  
One challenge to transboundary fisheries management is the lack of international 
jurisdiction with the authority to enforce agreements. Any agreement on cooperative 
management has to be self-enforcing. A large literature of game theory models illustrates 
mechanisms designed to resolve conflicts over the international harvesting of fish. Munro 
(1979), Clark (1980), Kaitala and Pohjola (1988), Levhari and Mirman (1980), and Vislie 
(1987), among others, study simultaneous harvest of a single fish stock by competing fleets. 
Hannesson (1997) examines how critical the number of agents sharing a fish stock is for 
realizing the cooperative solution. Hannesson (1995) and McKelvey (1997) address the 
management of a sequentially harvested fish stock. Hannesson examines cooperative 
management as a self-enforcing equilibrium in a non-cooperative game. McKelvey studies the 
transboundary fishery problem in a principal-agent setting. Kaitala and Munro (1997) and 
Kaitala and Lindroos (1998) study the related question of the management of straddling fish 
stocks.  
With the exception of McKelvey (1997), the game theoretic literature reviewed above 
neglects uncertainty. Yet fisheries are plagued by uncertainty regarding biological processes 
as well as implementation of management objectives.
1 When stock recruitment varies 
stochastically or management plans are implemented with error, parties negotiating over 
cooperative management cannot monitor adherence to the agreement by other fleets. 
                                                 
1 In the context of a fishery managed by a single authority, fisheries management under uncertainty has received 
considerable attention. Sethi et al. (2002) analyze a bioeconomic model with multiple sources of uncertainty. 
Reed (1978, 1979) considers stochastic variation in recruitment. Clark and Kirkwood (1986) examine variation 
in stock measurements.    3
Enforcement of agreements becomes more difficult. Laukkanen (2003) considers stochastic 
stock recruitment in a transboundary fishery where two fleets operate sequentially, and 
describes a self-enforcing agreement that can support cooperative harvesting. Another 
important source of variation is the ability of management in each country participating in 
negotiations to achieve management targets in any one year. We study the effects of this 
source of uncertainty, which we refer to as implementation uncertainty, on the prospects of 
international cooperation. We compare the implications of implementation uncertainty and 
recruitment uncertainty for cooperative harvesting. Differing from the sequential fishery 
model in Laukkanen (2003), we consider a shared fishery where the competing countries 
harvest simultaneously. Growth and reproduction depend on how much each fleet leaves 
behind after harvesting.  
The results indicate that non-binding cooperation in a shared fishery with 
implementation uncertainty can only be sustained when uncertainty is not too prevalent. Even 
when cooperative harvesting can be agreed upon, the parties engage in frequent punishment 
phases of reversion to the non-cooperative harvesting strategies. The implications of 
recruitment uncertainty for non-binding cooperation are less detrimental than those of 
implementation uncertainty. The agreement obtains for larger fluctuations, and less frequent 
punishment phases are necessary to sustain cooperation. 
2  The Bioeconomic Model  
We extend Hannesson’s (1997) model of a transboundary fishery to consider 
uncertainty in the form of inaccurate implementation of target escapements. Consider two 
countries that harvest a shared stock of fish. Each country harvests in its own area where 
harvest is controlled by a single management authority. The fish migrate only slowly between 
the areas. Each country harvests the portion of the stock that is present in its fishing area. 
Stock growth depends on the aggregate size of the stock. Such interdependency arises for 
example when fish migrate in a seasonal pattern or when eggs and larvae are distributed over 
the entire habitat of the stock irrespective of where they are spawned. Following Hannesson 
(1997) we let the stock be measured as a density, i.e. units of fish per unit area. The unit cost 
of harvest depends on the density of the stock and thus indirectly on the size of the stock, 
provided that the area that the stock occupies remains constant throughout the fishing season. 
Without loss of generality we define the area that the stock occupies as the unit area.    4
The aggregate stock available for harvest in the beginning of a fishing season is 
t X . 
The stock is uniformly distributed over the fishing area shared by two agents. Agent i has 
access to the stock 
t
iX γ , where  i γ  is agent i’s share of the fishing area.
2 By assumption, the 
fish do not migrate from one agent’s area to another during the fishing season. Each agent 
then controls harvest and escapement in his area. After the fishing season the stock grows and 
redistributes itself over the entire area. The growth of the fish stock is determined by how 
much is left behind in total after harvesting. In the absence of uncertainty, the fish stock 
changes from one period to the next as follows: 
 



















i S  is the escapement set by fishery manager i and  ( ) ∑ =
2
1 , i t i S R  is a differentiable and 
strictly concave spawning stock – recruitment function.  
Implementation uncertainty occurs when there are discrepancies between the intended 
consequences of management actions and the actual consequences. We model this 
discrepancy by including random variation in the form of a multiplicative shock on the 
intended escapement 
T
i S  of Agent i. The actual escapement in subfishery i then is 
T
t , i t , i
R
t , i S S θ = . 
The random shocks  t , i θ ,  1,2 i    = , are independent of each other and t. Each shock is 
distributed on a finite interval [] i i b , a , where  ∞ < < < < i i b a 1 0 , with a cumulative distribution 
function  i F  and continuous density  i f . By assumption, the fishery managers know the 
distributions.  
Let x denote the size of the stock available to Agent i at any moment in time, c the unit 
cost of fishing effort, and p the price of catch. Assuming that the harvest follows the Schaefer 
production function, the marginal cost of harvest for each agent is  x / c . In period t Agent i’s 
profits from harvesting the stock from 
t
iX γ  down to 
T
t , i t , i
R
t , i S S θ =   are  
 
                                                 
2 As noted by Hannesson (1997), the assumption that the fish are uniformly distributed over the fishing area is 
not necessary for maintaining constant share parameters. It is sufficient to assume that the stock redistributes 
itself in the same way after each fishing period.    5
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The expected present value of harvest is  ∑
∞
=0 , , t t i
t
t i E π δ θ , where 
t δ  denotes the common 
discount factor δ  raised to the tth power. Each agent can either act alone to maximize the 
expected flow of profits from his share of the fishery, or cooperate with the other fishery 
manager in order to maximize the joint profit and then bargain for a fair share of that profit. 
The action available to Agent i is setting the target escapement 
T
t , i S , which together 
with the initial stock  t iX γ  feeding in Agent i’s area and the stochastic multiplier  t , i θ  
determines Agent i’s profits. Agent i’s strategy  +
+
+ ℜ → ℜ
1 2 :
t t
i s  defines Agent i’s target 
escapement as a function of past and present recruitments and Agent i’s past target 








t i S S X X s S 1 , 0 , 0 , ,..., , ,..., − = γ γ . The choice of domain reflects the fact that 
Agent i does not observe target escapements set by the competitor but only observes the 
initial stock  t iX γ  available in Area i in the beginning of the fishing season. A contingent 
strategy for agent i is an infinite sequence  { } ,... ,
1 0
i i i s s s = . A Nash equilibrium is a strategy 
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for each agent i and all feasible strategies  i s .    6
  We will next consider the implications of non-cooperative harvest in the shared fishery 
where target escapements are implemented with error. We will then describe a cooperative 
agreement that can be supported in the presence of implementation uncertainty. We will 
conclude with a numerical example of the joint management game under implementation 
uncertainty, and compare the results to an agreement in the case of recruitment uncertainty.  
3  Non-cooperative harvesting 
We first describe the consequences of non-cooperative harvesting, where each fishery 
manager sets a target escapement without accounting for its effect on the expected payoff to 
the other fleet. There are no negotiations or understandings between the agents. Each agent 
maximizes his expected payoff, taking as given the other fleet’s target escapement which he 
can only infer from his knowledge of the other fleet’s objective function. Fleet i will 





−  at the outset of 
harvest is positive. By assumption,  ( ) p / c S R j
* T
t , j t , j i > ∑ θ γ  for all  ( ) j j j b , a ∈ θ ,  2 1, j = , where 
* T
t , j S  
is Agent j’s non-cooperative target escapement. Both agents then participate in non-
cooperative harvest in any state of nature.  
 Agent  i’s non-cooperative expected discounted payoff in period t is 
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By assumption, at time t the current stock  t X  is known but    1    ≥ + n , X n t  is not. That is,  t , i θ  is 
realized after the period t target escapement 
T
t , i S  has been set. The first order condition for 
maximizing (3) subject to (4) is 
    7
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γ θ δθ .
3 
   
We call the target escapement 
T
t , i S  that solves equation (5) the non-cooperative target 
escapement 
* T
i S . The non-cooperative escapements give rise to the expected non-cooperative 
equilibrium profits 
*
i Eπ . Note that the predictions from the shared fishery model, where each 
fishery controls the portion of the stock feeding in its exclusive fishing area, are less 
pessimistic that those from the sequential fishery models by Hannesson (1995), McKelvey 
(1997), and Laukkanen (2003). Instead of harvesting down to the zero marginal profit level 
p / c , the agents now partially account for the expected effect of their harvest on the stock 
available next year.  
  We next study how the solution to the individual agent’s problem in equation (5) 
compares to the global optimum where one agent controls the entire fishery. The expected 
payoff  TOT EV  is the sum of the two agents’ payoffs,  
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TOT S ln X ln c S X p E EV θ γ θ γ δ . 
 
The first order condition for the globally optimal target escapement 
T
t , i S  that maximizes 
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γ θ δθ .
4 
 
We denote the globally optimal target escapement that solves (7) by 
O
i S .  
                                                 
3 Appendix 1 presents the derivation of equation (5).  
4 Appendix 1 presents the derivation of equation (7).   8
The individual agent’s first order condition in (5) balances the marginal benefit of an 
additional unit of harvest this year to the expected marginal loss of profits next year that 
follows reduced recruitment. An individual agent does not account for the effect of reduced 
recruitment on the expected benefits accruing to the other fleet harvesting the stock. The 
global first order condition in (7) instead accounts for the effect of additional harvest in one 
fishery on the expected benefits to both fisheries in the following year. Since  i S / c p −  is 
increasing in  i S , the  i S  solving (5) is smaller than the  i S  solving (7). An individual agent 
that makes harvest decisions independently of other fleets targeting the shared stock leaves a 
suboptimal escapement from the point of view of the fishery as a whole.  
  We next study whether negotiating on a joint harvesting strategy enables the agents to 
manage the resource more successfully. We describe an agreement that is designed to support 
cooperation when management plans are implemented with error and commitment is not 
possible. What is the likelihood that two agents sharing a fish stock will cooperate in setting 
their management objectives? How does the likelihood of cooperation depend on the degree 
of uncertainty in implementing escapement targets?    
4  Cooperative harvesting 
Suppose that the agents negotiate, and agree on a cooperative management strategy 
that yields higher expected payoffs to each agent. Hannesson (1997) provides a deterministic 
model to study cooperative harvesting in a shared fishery. Cooperative management is 
supported by the threat of reverting to non-cooperative harvesting if deviation is detected. 
Uncertainty in implementation of target escapements complicates the enforcement of 
harvesting agreements. Agents are no longer able to observe the management actions of the 
competitor, and agents themselves cannot be sure of what will be interpreted as defection. 
Reverting to non-cooperative harvest for ever if low stock levels are observed, the punishment 
strategy used in most repeated game models of shared resource management, would be 
unnecessarily harsh in that non-cooperative harvest could be triggered by bad luck rather than 
cheating. Instead, we follow Green and Porter (1984) and consider an agreement where the 
agents settle on the threat strategies of reversion to the non-cooperative target escapements for 
a finite number of periods if violations of the agreement are detected. 
Suppose that the agents agree on constrained Pareto efficient cooperative escapement 
levels that maximize the expected joint benefit from the fishery, subject to the constraint that   9
it is in each agent’s interest to adhere to the agreement. Side payments are not considered and 
each agent must harvest to earn a profit. In order to enforce cooperation the agents settle on 
the trigger strategy of reverting to the non-cooperative target escapements 
* T
i S  if stock levels 
below an agreed upon trigger stock level  X  are observed. The punishment phase will last for 
1 − T  periods. At the conclusion of the punishment phase, the agents return to the cooperative 
target escapement levels. The agents commence harvesting in accordance with their 
cooperative target escapement levels 
TC
i S  in a Nash equilibrium in trigger strategies. They 
continue to do so until the recruitment 
t X  falls below the trigger level  X . Once an 
t X  below 
X  has been observed,  1 − T  periods of punishment follow, during which the agents harvest to 
the non-cooperative target escapements 
* T
i S  regardless of what 
t X  is. At the conclusion of the 
1 − T  punishment periods cooperation is resumed. Once resumed, cooperation prevails until 
the next time that  X X < .  
The agreement is defined as follows. The game has normal and reversionary stages. 
Agent i regards period t as normal if   
(a)  0 = t ,  
(b)  1 − t  was normal and  X X
t > ,  or  X X
T t <
−  and  1 − −T t  was normal,  
and reversionary otherwise.  
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The target escapement that Agent i sets in a normal period determines his expected current 
payoff and the probability of triggering a punishment phase. Cooperative target escapements 





j S R X θ
~
. The probability that cooperation continues in 
the following period is  () X X P
C ≥
~




When setting the period t target escapement, the agents know the current stock  t X  but 
future stocks    1    ≥ + n , X n t are not known. Given the current stock  X , the expected payoff from 
setting a target escapement 
T
i S  in a normal period is  
   10
(8)     
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is the expected current period payoff given the current stock X, and  
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are the expected cooperative and reversionary payoffs evaluated at time t when the future 
stock 
C X
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In the first period of a reversionary phase the agents revert to their non-cooperative target 
escapements 
* T
i S . The expected profit  i , 1 ω  in the first reversionary period is conditioned on 
the stock falling below the trigger stock level,  X X
~ C < . For the following  2 − T  periods stock 
recruitment is 
N X
~  and the agents receive the expected non-cooperative profit  i , 2 ω . In period   11
1 − +T t  the agents resume the cooperative target escapements which at the non-cooperative 
stock recruitment 
N X
~   yield the expected profit  i , 3 ω . 
We first solve for  ()




i S , X ~ EV
<  in (8c) and insert the solution into the equation for 
()




i S , X ~ EV
≥  in (8b). We then derive a closed form solution for  ()




i S , X ~ EV
≥ . We 
next insert  ()




i S , X ~ EV
≥  and  ()




i S , X ~ EV
<  into (8) and solve for the optimal target 
escapement 
T
i S  under cooperation in trigger strategies.  
The probability of reversion  () X X P
C <
~
 is given by the distribution of 
C X
~
 at  X , defined 
by  ( )
T T S S X F





j S R X θ
~
 is derived from 
the distributions of the  i θ ,  1,2    = i . Appendix 2 presents the derivation for uniformly 
distributed random multipliers  i θ . The expected payoff  ()




i S , X ~ EV
<  in (8c) can then be 
written as  
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Adding and subtracting 
p
i , 2 ω  in the numerator yields 
   12
(11)    () () () ( ) () [ ] {}
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Agent i’s expected cooperative payoff in (11) is the sum of the expected payoff under non-
cooperation, and the expected per period gain from cooperation plus the expected payoff 
accruing from transition to and from punishment period.  
By assumption, the agents observe the current stock before setting their period t target 
escapement. Equation (8) yields the expected payoff from leaving an escapement 
T
i S  in period 
t, evaluated after the current stock  X  has been observed. Inserting (9) and (11) into (8) yields 
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The agents’ actions are not observed. After measuring the current stock  X , each agent 
chooses the target escapement that maximizes his expected cooperative payoff in (12). Given 
T
i j S
≠ ,  X , and T, Agent i’s optimal cooperative target escapement 
TC
i S  must satisfy 
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The optimal target escapement again balances the expected marginal benefit of additional 
harvest to the loss of expected benefits next season, now caused by two factors: reduced 
recruitment, and an increased probability of entering a punishment phase. With probability 
( )
T T S S X F 2 1 , , 1− , cooperation continues in the next period. With probability  ( )
T T S S X F 2 1 , ,,  
the agents revert to non-cooperative harvest and return to cooperation only in period T. The 
increased probability of reversion is weighed by the expected loss of gains from cooperation 
relative to non-cooperative harvest, and the expected punishment phase payoff.  
We next examine the optimal design of the cooperative agreement. Countries negotiate 
on the length of the punishment phase and the trigger stock level knowing that each country 




i S , X EV . We next describe how the countries 
choose the length of the punishment phase T and the trigger stock level  X  in an optimal 
manner, given that for any T and  X  pair each fishery manager’s optimal target escapement 







i S , X EV S max   arg = . Formally, T and  X  are set to maximize the 
expected joint payoff 
 







0 1 α α − + = , 
 
subject to each 
T




i S , X EV , and each agent obtaining at least his expected 
non-cooperative payoff. The share α  in (15) is the weight on Agent 1’s payoff in the joint 








i S , X EV S max   arg =  is a self-enforcing equilibrium, and the strategies are subgame 
perfect. The cooperative solution is not renegotiation proof. At the outset of a punishment 
phase, the countries could confer and decide to continue cooperative harvest. However, 
renegotiation would unravel the rational for cooperation. It will then be in each country’s 
interest to follow the agreement in punishment periods as well.  
  If the cooperative solution is such that  ( ) 0 , , 2 1 >
TC TC S S X F , punishment phases of 
reversion to non-cooperative harvests are observed with a positive probability even if the 
countries agree on a cooperative harvesting strategy. The punishment periods are necessary to 
support the cooperative agreement. We next examine how frequently retaliatory periods will   14
occur if two countries have agreed upon a joint harvesting strategy. We determine the 
expected ratio of cooperative to non-cooperative periods and the expected percentage of time 
spent in cooperation during a cycle. Denote the number of consecutive periods during which 
the agents cooperate by M. The number of cooperative periods is a random variable whose 
distribution depends on  ( )
TC TC S S X F 2 1 , , . The probability of cooperation in a normal period t is 
( )
TC TC S S X F 2 1 , , 1−  and the probability of reversion is  ( )
TC TC S S X F 2 1 , , . The probability of 
cooperation in M successive periods then is  () []
M TC TC S S X F 2 1 , , 1− , and the probability of 
cooperation lasting exactly M  periods is  () [] ()
TC TC M TC TC S S X F S S X F 2 1 2 1 , , , , 1− . Given the 
distribution of M, the expected number of successive cooperative periods is given by 
() [] ()
TC TC M TC TC
M
S S X F S S X F M 2 1 2 1
0
, , , , 1− ∑
∞
=
. With the length of the punishment phase  1 − T , 
the expected ratio of cooperative periods to punishment periods, denoted by Q, is 
 
(16)     () [] ()
TC TC M TC TC
M
S S X F S S X F M
T
Q 2 1 2 1
0










The expected percentage of time spent in cooperation, denoted by R,  becomes 
  
(17)     () [] ()
TC TC M TC TC
M
S S X F S S X F
T M
M
R 2 1 2 1
0









5  A Numerical Illustration of Cooperation in Trigger Strategies 
5.1  Parameter Values and Functional Forms 
This section presents a numerical example that illustrates the joint management game. 
Table 1 displays the parameter values. The parameter values were chosen to reflect a realistic 
range. Prices and costs are the same for both countries. Prices are normalized to one. Average 
recruitment follows the Ricker spawning stock – recruitment relation  ()
lS kSe S R = . We 
consider the case of uniformly distributed random multipliers  i θ ,  2 , 1 = i . The probability 
density function for  i θ  is   15
 






elsewhere,                  0
a for         
1
i i i






where  i i a ε − =1  and  i i b ε + =1 . The mean of  i θ  is 1 and the variance is  3 /
2 2
i i ε σ = . We 
explore small, moderate, and large fluctuations in realized escapements, corresponding to 
values of  i ε  ranging through  1 . 0 = i ε , 3 . 0 = i ε , and  5 . 0 = i ε . The coefficient of variation 
ranges from 0.18 ( 1 . 0 = i ε ) to 0.41 ( 5 . 0 = i ε ).  
 
  [Table  1  here] 
 
5.2  Computation of the Joint Management Game 
The numerical results were computed using Mathematica 4.0. The optimal agreement 
is the set { }
T T S , S , X , T 2 1  that maximizes the expected joint payoff  ()
T T S , S , X , T , X J 2 1 0  in (15). 
We proceeded by searching over T and  X  and computing the individually optimal target 
escapements 
T
i S  for each  X , T  pair. We considered values of T ranging from 2 to 51 years 




i i iS a R  to the maximum of the recruitment function 
() S R , denoted by  max X . In terms of the expected payoffs a punishment phase of 50 years is 
practically equivalent to a punishment phase of infinite length. The probability of reversion is 




i i iS a R  and 1 for values of  X  greater than  max X . Examining 
the set  [] 51 , 2 ∈ T ,  ( ) [ ] max
2
1
* , X S a R X
i i i ∑ = ∈  thus suffices to consider all possible agreement 
outcomes. The initial stock was set equal to the expected stock at the non-cooperative target 
escapements. The weight α  on Agent i‘s payoff was 0.5. The proportion of the stock that 
each agent controls,  i γ , varied between  1 . 0  and  9 . 0 .  
We computed the optimal target escapements and the agents’ expected benefits in the 
non-cooperative equilibrium, in the globally optimal equilibrium, and under the trigger stock 
agreement. The optimal trigger stock agreement is in addition characterized by the optimal   16
length of the punishment phase and the optimal trigger stock. The length of the punishment 
phase and the trigger stock in turn determine the ratio of cooperative periods to punishment 
periods, and the percentage of time spent in cooperation.  Tables 2 and 3 display the full 
results. Figures 1 to 6 illustrate the optimal agreement.  
In order to compare the prospects of cooperation in the presence of two different types 
of uncertainty, we also computed the non-cooperative, globally optimal and trigger stock 
equilibria with stochastic variation in recruitment. Tables 4 to 6 report the full results for the 
recruitment uncertainty case. Figures 7 to 15 illustrate the optimal agreement. Table 7 
compares the implications of the two sources of variation for implicit cooperation in trigger 
strategies.  
5.3  The Optimal Agreement under Implementation Uncertainty 
The cooperative agreement in trigger strategies is supported as a self-enforcing 
equilibrium for a limited range of parameter values (Figures 1 and 2). The equilibrium in 
trigger strategies only exists when implementation shocks are small or moderate ( 1 0. = ε , 
3 0. = ε ), and when the stock is relatively evenly split between the two agents ( 4 . 0 1 = γ  to 
6 . 0 1 = γ ). When large fluctuations are possible ( 5 0. = ε ), the agents are better off harvesting 
in accordance with their non-cooperative strategies. With large implementation shocks, the 
likelihood of a low stock level launching a punishment phase is noticeable, and cooperation 
becomes a volatile exercise. The target escapement needed to balance the tradeoff between 
the expected current period profit and the probability of triggering a punishment phase is so 
large that the non-cooperative target escapement yields higher expected payoffs. A fishery 
with a large share of the stock is also better off following its individual harvesting strategy. It 
controls the size of the stock available in its fishing zone in the next period to a considerable 
extent even if it operates on its own. Setting a large target escapement in order to account for 
an increased probability of triggering a reversionary phase is not profitable. 
 
[Figures 1 and 2] 
 
The probability of reversion is markedly above 0 for all parameter values (Figures 3 
and 4). When implementation shocks are moderate ( 3 . 0 = ε ) and the agents control uneven 
shares of the fishery ( 4 . 0 1 = γ , 0.6), the probability of reversion is 0.02. The probability of   17
reversion increases to 0.07 when the agents control equal shares of the fishery. The 
probability of reversion is even higher with small implementation shocks ( 1 . 0 = ε ), ranging 
from 0.05 when the shares differ, to 0.13 when agents control equal shares of the fishery. 
When the shares differ, the target escapements are close to the non-cooperative target 
escapements. With equal shares, both agents gain noticeably more from cooperation, but the 
target escapements are also markedly larger than in the case of unequal shares. The temptation 
to decrease the target escapement is notable, and a higher probability of reversion is needed to 
support cooperation.  
 
[Figures 3 and 4] 
 
The length of the punishment phase is greater when implementation shocks are 
moderate ( 3 . 0 = ε ) than when the shocks are small ( 1 . 0 = ε ).  As a result, the ratio of 
cooperative to non-cooperative periods and the percentage of time spent in cooperation are 
higher when fluctuations are small, regardless of the higher probability of reversion (Figures 5 
and 6). The agents cooperate as much as 75 % of time when fluctuations are small, as 
opposed to at most 57 % of time when fluctuations are moderate. Some asymmetry makes 
cooperation more likely.  For both small and moderate amounts of implementation 
uncertainty, the percentage of time spent in cooperation is greater when the agents’ shares of 
the fishery differ than when the shares are equal.  
 
[Figures 5 and 6] 
 
 The expected payoffs under trigger strategies are greater than the non-cooperative 
ones but smaller than those obtaining under the globally optimal policy. Even when the target 
escapements are close to the globally optimal levels ( 1 . 0 = i ε ), punishment strategies are 
applied as much as 47 % of time in a cycle. The frequent punishment phases decrease the 
expected payoffs. Because each fishery controls a part of the stock and partially accounts for 
the effect of current harvest on future stock levels, the differences between the expected 
payoffs under the three different management scenarios are not substantial (Figures 1 and 2). 
The gains from cooperation are more pronounced when non-cooperative harvest entails 
harvesting down to the zero marginal profit level, as in high seas fisheries where competing   18
fleets harvest in one area. The shared fishery model allows for partial ownership of the 
resource, and the consequences of uncoordinated harvest are less detrimental than in the case 
of simultaneous harvest by competing fleets.  
5.4  The Optimal Agreement under Recruitment Uncertainty 
The biological model with stochastic recruitment is  
 


















t i S R X θ , 
 
where the  t R, θ  are uniformly distributed random variables with probability density function  
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where  R R a ε − =1  and  R R b ε + =1 . The mean of  R θ  is 1 and the variance is  3 /
2 2
R R ε σ = . The 
non-cooperative, globally optimal and trigger stock equilibria with a multiplicative shock on 
recruitment are derived similarly to the implementation uncertainty case. The expected 
payoffs and the agents’ first order conditions under recruitment uncertainty are as in the 
implementation uncertainty model, but stochastic variation is only present in stock 
recruitment as defined by equation (19). The cumulative distribution function of 
() 2 1 S S R X R + =θ  is  () ( ) () 2 1 2 1 / , , S S R x F S S x F R X + = , where  () ⋅ R F  is the cumulative 
distribution of  R θ . The details of the derivation are available from the author upon request.  
The cooperative equilibrium in trigger strategies is supported for small, moderate, and 
large fluctuations in recruitment ( 1 . 0 = ε , 3 . 0 = ε , and  5 . 0 = ε ). The initial stock determines 
whether a period is cooperative or reversionary. When stochastic shocks occur in recruitment 
only, the stock is a function of one random variable. When target escapements are 
implemented with error, the stock is a function of two random variables. For identically 
distributed recruitment and implementation shocks, the variance of the stock is smaller under 
recruitment uncertainty than under implementation uncertainty, and cooperation is easier to 
sustain. (Tables 4 to 6, figures 7 to 9).   19
 
[Figures 7 to 9] 
 
When fluctuations in recruitment are large or small ( 1 . 0   , 5 . 0 = ε ), cooperation can be 
sustained for the same range of share parameters  1 γ  as in the case of escapement uncertainty 
(4 . 0 1 = γ  to  6 . 0 1 = γ ). When recruitment uncertainty is moderate ( 3 . 0 = ε ), cooperation can 
be sustained for a somewhat wider range of share parameters (from  3 . 0 1 = γ  to  7 . 0 1 = γ ). 
Why is asymmetry less detrimental for cooperation when fluctuations are moderate than when 
they are large or small? An agent with a large share of the fishing area has considerable 
control of the stock available in its fishing zone in the next period. In the case of stochastic 
recruitment, the expected payoff increases as fluctuations become larger. At moderate levels 
of uncertainty, the gains from cooperation are sufficiently large to make cooperation 
profitable even for an agent with a large share of the stock. However, the probability of 
reversion that is necessary to sustain cooperation also increases as fluctuations become larger. 
When large recruitment shocks occur ( 5 . 0 = ε ), the tradeoff between the expected payoff 
from the individual harvesting strategy and the cooperative target escapement that is required 
to account for the increased probability of a reversionary phase becomes too large for an agent 
with a sizeable share of the stock.  
The probability of entering a reversionary period is close to zero for large and 
moderate fluctuations ( 3 . 0 , 5 . 0 = ε ), but considerably higher when fluctuations are small 
( 1 . 0 = ε ). The length of the punishment phase ranges from 2 to 21 periods. The range of T is 
similar for small, moderate and large fluctuations (Figures 10 to 12). Even though the 
punishment phases are relatively short when fluctuations are small, the percentage of time 
spent in cooperation is markedly lower for small fluctuations than for large and moderate 
fluctuations: The agents cooperate 48 to 55 % of time when fluctuations are small, as opposed 
to as much as 92 to 97 % of time when fluctuations are moderate and 86 to 99 % of time 
when fluctuations are large. Why does more uncertainty make cooperation more likely in the 
case of recruitment uncertainty? The expected payoffs increase in the size of the fluctuations. 
The agents have more to gain from cooperation, and the agreement is easier to sustain. 
Regardless of the amount of uncertainty, the percentage of time spent in cooperation is higher 
when the agents control equal shares of the stock than when the shares differ. Uneven shares 
give rise to markedly uneven relative gains from cooperation. As a result, the probability of   20
reversion and the length of the punishment phase that are necessary to sustain cooperation are 
greater. (Figures 10 to 15). 
 
[Figures 10 to 15] 
[Table 7] 
6      Conclusion 
We examine cooperative and non-cooperative harvesting in a stochastic transboundary 
fishery shared by two agents. We consider the effects of both implementation and recruitment 
uncertainty on implicit cooperation in the management of the transboundary fishery. Even 
when each agent controls harvest in his share of the area that the fish stock occupies, the non-
cooperative target escapements are suboptimal. We define conditions under which 
cooperative harvesting can be sustained as a self-enforcing equilibrium when the actions of 
the agents are not observed. Even when the agents cooperate, reversionary periods occur with 
a positive probability. While the agents know that a low stock level may reflect a negative 
shock rather than cheating on behalf of the competitor, it is rational to participate in 
reversionary periods. Otherwise, there would be no incentive to cooperate. The equilibrium is 
subgame perfect but not renegotiation proof. Supposedly the agents could renegotiate and 
agree to continue cooperation after low stock levels have been observed. However, the parties 
realize that renegotiating would unravel the rational for cooperation.  
The numerical example shows that the trigger stock agreement can be implemented for 
a range of parameter values. The agreement can only be supported as a self-enforcing 
equilibrium when uncertainty is not too pronounced. Even when the cooperative agreement in 
trigger strategies does obtain, a substantial part of time in each cycle is spent in reversion to 
the punishment strategies. In the presence of implementation uncertainty, the agents may have 
to apply the reversionary strategies as much as 72 % of time in a cycle in order to support the 
implicit cooperative agreement. Furthermore, the trigger stock agreement only obtains when 
the agents control close to equal shares of the fishery. The numerical results indicate that the 
implications of recruitment uncertainty for implicit cooperation in transboundary fisheries 
management are less detrimental than those of implementation uncertainty. The agreement is 
supported for larger fluctuations, and less frequent punishment phases suffice to enforce the 
agreement. The parties engage in cooperative play as much as 99 % of time in a cycle.    21
Recruitment uncertainty arises from environmental factors that are only partially and 
indirectly controlled by management efforts. Implementation uncertainty instead occurs when 
management provisions fail to have the intended consequences. While noise and uncertain 
states of nature can contribute to implementation uncertainty, its basis is in how fishers react 
to management actions (Peyton 1987, White and Mace 1988). Rice and Richards (1996) argue 
that management system performance can be improved to reduce implementation uncertainty. 
Our results indicate that controlling implementation uncertainty would facilitate cooperation 
in transboundary fisheries management and improve the economic performance of shared 
fisheries. Addressing implementation uncertainty in each participating country can help create 
an environment where non-binding cooperation will succeed. 
This paper focuses on the effects of implementation uncertainty on international 
cooperation. Comparison of the implications of implementation uncertainty and recruitment 
uncertainty on international cooperation indicates different sources of uncertainty have 
different effects on the chances of non-binding cooperation. Future work would include 
investigating the prospects of international cooperation in fisheries management in the 
presence of more than one source of variation.    22
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Appendix 1. Derivation of the individually optimal and globally optimal target 
escapements under non-cooperation. 
 
Agent i’s objective is to maximize his expected payoff  
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t j t t j S R X θ .  
 
By assumption,  0 X  is known and given at  0 = t , and  t X  is known at time t but    1   ≥ + j , X j t  is 
not. The  t i, θ  are realized after the period t target escapement 
T
t , i S  has been set.  
Given the period t stock  t X , fishery manager i’s problem is to maximize (A1.1) 
subject to (A1.2) by choice of the target escapement 
T
t , i S . The dynamic programming equation 
for the manager’s problem is  
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subject to the stock equation (A1.2). 
  The first order necessary condition for the problem on the right hand side of (A1.3) is 
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Applying the Benveniste-Scheinkman formula to evaluate  () 1 + ′ t X V  gives  
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Substituting (A1.5) into the first order necessary condition in (A1.4) and using the stock 
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The global fishery manager’s objective is to maximize the total expected payoff, 
which is the sum of the individual agents’ payoffs  
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subject to the stock equation in (A1.2). 
The dynamic programming equation for the society’s problem is 
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The first order necessary condition for maximizing the right hand side of (A1.8) is 
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Applying the Benveniste-Scheinkman formula to evaluate  () 1 + ′ t X V  and using (A1.2) now 
gives  
 

































Substituting (A1.10) into (A1.9) gives the stochastic Euler equation 
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Appendix 2. Derivation of the probability distribution function of  () 2 2 1 1 S S R X θ θ + = . 
 
We start out with a pair of independent random variables  [] ′ = 2 1 θ θ θ ,  with a bivariate 
density  () ( ) ( ) () ( ) 2 2 1 1
2 2 1 1 2 1
1
,
a b a b
f f f
− −
= = θ θ θ θ θ . We consider the case where the 
stochastic multipliers  i θ  have equal support:    2 1 a a a = =  and  b b b = = 2 1 . We undertake 
deriving the distribution of  () 2 2 1 1 S S R X θ θ + = . We first derive the distribution of 
2 2 1 1 1 S S Y θ θ + =  using the algorithm described in De Groot (1986) for computing the 
distribution of a function of two random variables. The algorithm describes a transformation 
from 
2 ℜ  to 
2 ℜ , whereas we are interested in a transformation from 
2 ℜ  to 
1 ℜ . To this end, 
we construct a dummy random variable  2 2 θ = Y   and derive the distribution of 








2 1 S S
S . Integrating out  2 Y  from the distribution of Y yields 
the distribution of  1 Y . Given the distribution of  1 Y , it is straightforward to derive the 
distribution of  () ( ) 2 2 1 1 1 S S R Y R X θ θ + = = .  
The density  Y g  of Y  is defined as  () ( )() Y Y Y J Z f gY = , where Z is the inverse of S 
and  Y Z  is the inverse map  [] () Y Y z Z = = ′ = 2 1,θ θ θ , and  ) y ( J  denotes the Jacobian matrix 
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where T is the range of the function  θ S = Y , and  ()0 = Y g  otherwise.    29
The distribution  () Y Y g  in (A2.1) is the joint distribution of () () 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 θ θ θ , S S Y , Y + = . 
The distribution of  1 Y  is obtained by integrating out  2 Y . In order to obtain the limits of 
integration, we first have to determine the range T of the function  [] θ S Y Y = ′ = 2 1, Y . Figure 
A2.1 shows T, which is a trapezoid. We depict  1 Y  on the horizontal axis and  2 Y  on the vertical 
axis. In order to determine the shape of T, we fix  [] b , a Y y ∈ = = 2 2 2 θ  and examine which 
values  1 Y  can take. For  a Y = 2 ,  1 Y  ranges from  () 2 1 S S a +  to  2 1 aS bS + . For  b Y = 2 ,  1 Y  ranges 
from  2 1 bS aS +  to  () 2 1 S S b + . The range T is defined by the trapezoid with the corners at 
() () a , S S a 2 1 + ,  () a , aS bS 2 1 + ,  () () b , S S b 2 1 + ,  () b , bS aS 2 1 + . We integrate out  2 Y  for every 
value of  1 y  in the support of the marginal, which is  () () [] 2 1 2 1 S S b , S S a + + . As we can see 
from Figure A2.1, the integral has to be computed in three pieces. Two cases arise depending 
on whether (i)  2 1 2 1 aS bS bS aS + ≤ +  or (ii)  2 1 2 1 aS bS bS aS + > + .  
Consider first case (i). The interval associated with  2 y  on the vertical axis is  
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Integrating out  2 Y  yields the density of  1 Y : 
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In case  (ii),  2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 S a S b S b S a + > + . The interval associated with  2 y  on the vertical 
axis is  
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Integrating out  2 Y  as above yields  
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The cumulative distribution function for  1 Y  is obtained by integrating the probability 
density function. In case (i),  2 1 2 1 aS bS bS aS + ≤ + , the cumulative distribution function is  
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In case (ii),   2 1 2 1 aS bS bS aS + > + , the cumulative distribution function is  
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Given the distribution of   2 2 1 1 1 S S Y θ θ + = , the cumulative distribution function of 
() ( ) 1 2 2 1 1 Y R S S R X = + = θ θ  can be written as  
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provided that the inverse  () x R
1 −  exists. The density of X is recovered by differentiating  x F , 
which yields  
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Appendix 3. First order conditions for non-cooperative and cooperative target 
escapements under recruitment uncertainty.   
 
Agent i’s first order condition for the optimal non-cooperative target escapement 
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The first order condition for the sole owner optimal target escapements 
O
i S :  































t , j j
N
j
t , j j
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The payoffs and the agents’ first order conditions under the trigger stock agreement are 
written as in the case of implementation uncertainty, but stochastic variation is only present in 
stock recruitment as defined in equation (19). The cumulative distribution function of 
() 2 1 S S R X R + =θ  is given by  () ( ) () 2 1 2 1 / , , S S R x F S S x F R X + = , where  () ⋅ R F  is the 
cumulative distribution of  R θ . 
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Table 1. Example parameters 
Parameter Value 
p   1 
c   6.8 
k   4.5 
l   -1.8 10
-2 
δ    0.95 
 
Table 2. Agreement on joint management under implementation uncertainty.  1 . 0 = ε  
1 γ   TC S1  
TC S2  
*
1
T S  
*
2
T S   X   T F  C EV1  
C EV2  
*
1 EV  
*
2 EV   Q R 
0.1    7  27            3  812     
0.2    8  24            69  674     
0.3      9  22           163 548    
0.4  11 19 11 18  76  3  0,0552  262 443 258  439  8,0  75 
0.5  18 18 14 14  83  4  0,1302  364 364 346  346  2,2  53 
0.6  19 11 18 11  76  3  0,0552  443 262 439  258  8,0  75 
0.7    22  9            548  163     
0.8      24  8          674  69   
0.9    27  7            812  3     
34 . 18 2 1 = =
O O S S . 367 2 1 = =
O O EV EV  at  5 . 0 2 1 = =γ γ . 
 
Table 3. Agreement on joint management under implementation uncertainty.  3 . 0 = ε  
1 γ  
TC S1  











2 EV   Q R 
0.1     7  27           1  800     
0.2     8  24          65  665     
0.3     9  21           158  541     
0.4  11  18  11  18  75 22 0,0194  253  434  252  433 2,41 57 
0.5  16  16  14  14  74 25 0,0740  348  348  340  340 0,52 28 
0.6  18  11  18  11  75 22 0,0194  434  253  433  252 2,00 57 
0.7     21  9          541 158    
0.8     24  8          665  65    
0.9     27  7          800  1    
23 . 18 2 1 = =
O O S S .  361 2 1 = =
O O EV EV  at  5 . 0 2 1 = =γ γ  
 
Table 4. Agreement on joint management under recruitment uncertainty.  1 . 0 = ε  
1 γ  
TC S1  











2 EV   Q R 
0.1     7  27           3  814     
0.2     8  25          69  676     
0.3     9  22           164  550     
0.4 12 20  11 18  76  4  0,16 264 440  259  440  1,75  48 
0.5 18 18  14 14  77  7  0,069 359 359  347  347  2,25  55 
0.6 20 12  18 11  76  4  0,16 440 264  440  259  1,75  48 
0.7     22  9           550 164    
0.8     25  8           676  69    
0.9     27  7           814  3    
36 . 18 2 1 = =
O O S S . 368 2 1 = =
O O EV EV  at  5 . 0 2 1 = =γ γ    35
Table 5. Agreement on joint management under recruitment uncertainty.  3 . 0 = ε  
1 γ  
TC S1  











2 EV   Q R 
0.1     7  27           5  816    
0.2     8  25          71  678    
0.3 10 25  9 22  59  21  0.00054 179 559  166  552  93  96 
0.4 13 21  11 18  58  8  0,0032 278 452  261  442  45  92 
0.5 16 16  14 14  57  2  0,0066 362 362  349  349  150  97 
0.6 21 13  18 11  58  8  0,0032 452 278  442  261  45  92 
0.7 25 10  22  9  59  21  0.00054 559 179  552  166  93  96 
0.8      25  8          678  71     
0.9      27  7          816  5     
36 . 18 2 1 = =
O O S S . 370 2 1 = =
O O EV EV  at  5 . 0 2 1 = =γ γ  
Table 6. Agreement on joint management under recruitment uncertainty.  5 . 0 = ε  
1 γ  
TC S1  
TC S2  
*
1
T S  
*
2
T S   X   T F  C EV1  
C EV2  
*
1 EV  
*
2 EV   Q R 
0.1     7  29           9  819    
0.2     8  25          75  682    
0.3     9  22           170  556    
0.4 10 20  11 18  41  9  0,0073 276 449  265  446  17  86 
0.5 16 16  14 14  40  4  0,00035 364 364  353  353  952  99 
0.6 20 10  18 11  41  9  0,0073 449 276  446  265  17  86 
0.7     22  9           556 170    
0.8     25  8           682  75    
0.9     29  7           819  9    
36 . 18 2 1 = =
O O S S . 374 2 1 = =
O O EV EV  at  5 . 0 2 1 = =γ γ  
Table 7.  Comparison of the implications of implementation and recruitment uncertainty for 
the prospects of cooperation in trigger strategies 
                            Source of uncertainty 
Agreement characteristics 
Implementatation shock  Recruitment shock 
Range of shocks  R i ε ε ,  for which 
agreement sustained 
Small, moderate  Small, moderate, large 
Range of shares  i γ  for which agreement 
sustained 
0.4 to 0.6  0.4 to 0.6 when shocks small or 
large  
0.3 to 0.7 when shocks moderate  
0.019 to 0.13  0.00035 to 0.0073 when shocks 
moderate or large 
0.069 to 0.16 when shocks small 
The smaller the shocks, the higher is F  
Probability of reversion (F) 
F is higher when shares 
even  
No monotonic relationship 
between shares and F 
2 to 24  3 to 20  Length of the punishment phase (T-1) 
T greater when shocks 
moderate  
Range of T similar for different 
degrees of uncertainty 
28 to 75 %   48 to 99 % 
R  high when shocks small  R low when shocks small, high 
when shocks large 
Percentage of time in cooperation (R) 
R high when shares differ  R high when shares equal  
Maximum percentage of  time in 
cooperation 
75 %, small fluctuations  99 %, large fluctuations 
Maximum percentage of time in non-
cooperation 
72 % , moderate 
fluctuations 
52%, small fluctuations   36
Fig. 1. Agents’ expected payoffs under non-cooperation and under the trigger stock 
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Fig. 2. Agents’ expected payoffs under non-cooperation and under the trigger stock 
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Fig. 3. The optimal length of punishment phase and the optimal probability of reversion. 
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Fig.4. The optimal length of punishment phase and the optimal probability of reversion. 
















































































Fig. 5. The expected ratio of cooperative to punishment periods and the percentage of time 









































Agent 1´s share γ 1  38
Fig. 6. The expected ratio of cooperative to punishment periods and the percentage of time 
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Fig. 7. Agents’ expected payoffs under non-cooperation and under the trigger stock 
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Fig. 8. Agents’ expected payoffs under non-cooperation and under the trigger stock 
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Fig. 9. Agents’ expected payoffs under non-cooperation and under the trigger stock 











Fig. 10. The optimal length of punishment phase and the optimal probability of reversion. 












Fig.11.  The optimal length of punishment phase and the optimal probability of reversion. 
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Fig.12. The optimal length of punishment phase and the optimal probability of reversion. 












Fig.13. The expected ratio of cooperative to punishment periods and the percentage of time 
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Fig.14. The expected ratio of cooperative to punishment periods and the percentage of time 














Fig.15. The expected ratio of cooperative to punishment periods and the percentage of time 
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 Figure A2.1. Limits of integration for integrating out Y2. 
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(ii)   as1 + bs2  >  bs1 + as2 
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